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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ImmUNITY FROM SUIT-EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORA-
TIoN.-The Emergency Fleet Corporation awarded a contract to the plaintiff,
but before complete execution refused to make further payments and unlawfully
took possession of its entire property. Held, that the defendant was not immune
as a governmental agency from suit in tort. Sloan Shipyards Corporation v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (1922, U. S.) 42
Sup. Ct. 386,
Although the state may not be sued without its own consent, its officers may be
impleaded personally for their torts. United States v. Clarke (0834, U. S.) 8
Pet. 436. Mitchell v. Harmony (1851, U. S.) 13 How. 115. The officer is not
suable when a judgment or decree against him would operate upon state property
or funds, as such relief is in reality relief against the state. Cunningham V,.
Macon-Brunswick Ry. (1883) lO9 U. S. 446, 3 Sup. Ct. 292; Belknap v. Schild
(1896) 161 U. S. 1O, 16 Sup, Ct. 443; see The Coldwater (1922, S. D. Fla.) 283
Fed. 146. For the same reason, state administrative boards, although membership
corporations, are not suable in tort. Moody v. State's Prison (IpoI) 128 N. C.
12, 38 S. E. 131; Leavell v. Asylum (igo6) 122 Ky. 213, 91 S. W. 671; Morrison
v. McLaren (1915) 16o Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475. There is a small minority
contra. But according to the instant case a governmental agency in the form
of a stock corporation loses its immunity and is analogous to the individual
officer in so far as liability to suit is concerned. The theory is that the corporate
entity is distinct from the corporation's stockholders, and that the ownership of
its stock by the state does not affect its status as a separate legal individual.
Bank of United States v. Planter." Bank (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 904; Bank of
Ky. v. Wister (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet 318; United States v. Strang (1921) 254
U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165. But an individual officer will respond to a judgment
with his private resources; the corporate state agency must respond with cor-
porate funds. When the corporation is financed entirely by the government, and
is sought to be charged for a tort committed which acting as an agent of the state,
it seems that the tax-payer's money is reached quite as effectively as in an action
against an administrative board, or against an officer to direct the disposal of
public property in his possession. See Ballaine v. Alaska Ry. (1919, C. C. A. 9th)
259 Fed. 183. In protecting them from other forms of attack, the courts have
recognized that the funds of corporate state agencies virtually belong to the
public. Such bodies are not subject to state taxation. McCullough v. Md. (18ig,
U. S.) 4 Wheat. 316; King County v. United States, etc. (1922, C. C. A. 9th)
282 Fed. 95o. Conspiracy to defraud them is a crime against the United States.
United States v. Union Timber Products Co. (1919, W. D. Wash.) 259 Fed. 907;
United States v. Carlin (1917, E. D. Pa.) 259 Fed. 9o4; contra, Salas v. United
States (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 234 Fed. 842. The corporate entity theory is usually
applied merely to evade the rule of sovereign immunity. In other situations, the
courts recognize the public nature of the corporate agent and its funds. This
inconsistency is probably justified in that the rule of the immunity of the
sovereign is certainly unjust, and possibly, in the United States, theoretically
unsound. See COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879; (1920) 29
ibid. 911.
ADMsIRALTY-EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-APPLICATION OF WORK-
MEN's COMPENSATION LAws.-The deceased, a longshoreman, while unloading a
vessel lying in navigable waters, fell on a dock, sustaining fatal injuries. The
New York Court of Appeals refused to award compensation. The case was
brought to the United States Supreme Court. Held, that the case was not within
the jurisdiction of admiralty. State Ind. Comm. v. Nordenholt Corporation
(1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 473.
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State workmen's compensation acts do not apply to cases within the jurisdiction
of admiralty. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct.
524; see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 255; (igig) 28 ibid 281.
Where the injury occurs in the course of the construction of a vessel already
launched but not completed, the workmen's compensation act is applicable on
the ground that the contract was non-maritime. Grant-Smith Porter Co. v.
Rhode (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 157; see (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 561;
NOTS (1922) 35 HARr. L. REv. 743. The instant case represents another step in
the Supreme Court's endeavor to define the extent of admiralty jurisdiction in
relation to the application of workmen's compensation acts, this time by insisting
on the established rule that the maritime nature of a tort depends on the
damage occurring on navigable waters as opposed to a dock. Thus the rule of
the Jensen case is being obscured by its exceptions. See Newham v. Chile
Exploration Co. (1921) 232 N. Y. 37, 39, 133 N. E. i2o. Where the contract and
injury are both maritime in nature, admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction; where
the contract is non-maritime and the injury is maritime, the state law may be
applicable; where the contract is maritime and the injury is non-maritime, the
state compensation law applies.
BANKS AND BANKiNG-DuTY OF BANK To SET OFF DEPosITs OF INDosE -.The
plaintiff bank acquired a note before maturity, for value, and without notice of
any defenses. While it held deposits to the credit of the indorser, it learned of
the failure of consideration from the payee-indorser to the maker, protested the
note at maturity, and fixed the indorser's liability. The plaintiff then sued the
maker. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff could recover only the
difference between the amount of the note and the amount of the deposits held
by the plaintiff to the credit of the indorser. Second Nat. Bank of Hoboken v.
McGehee (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 287.
A bank which is a holder of a note may set off the deposits of any party liable
thereon, but there is a conflict as to whether the failure of the bank to set off
the deposits of the maker releases the indorser. (915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
i5o; 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 944, note. Texas has consistently held that after notice
of failure of consideration, the bank's omission to set off the deposits of an
indorser whose liability has been fixed releases the maker pro tanto. Union Nat.
Bank v. Menefee (1911) 63 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 134 S. W. 822; contra, Mechanics
Bank v. Seitz (1892) 15o Pa. 632, 24 Atl. 356. A failure to set off the deposit
of one indorser does not release a subsequent indorser. Ticonic Bank v. Johnson
(1842) 21 Me. 426. There are balancing equities in this type of case. It is
difficult for the maker to get a judgment against a non-resident fraudulent
indorser. On the other hand, the rule of the principal case would make the
holder in due course determine at his peril whether there has been a failure of
consideration. The general custom of banks to collect rediscounted paper from
their immediate indorser in case of dishonor may well account for the few
cases on this point, but when there is a dispute the bank wishes to avoid tying
up its customers' funds pending the litigation and forcing him to collect from
the maker in the latter's jurisdiction. When the payee is an accommodated
party, within the knowledge of the bank, failure by the bank to avail itself of
his deposits discharges the maker. Tatuin v. Commercial Bank (19I5) 193 Ala.
12o, 69 So. 5o8. But this does not release a subsequent indorser. First Nat.
Bank v. Peltz (1896) 176 Pa. 513, 35 AtI. 218. This may be distinguished from
cases of failure of consideration because in the case of the accommodated payee-
indorser the true state of facts may ordinarily be ascertained by mere inquiry.
Once his status is determined the bank should -treat him as primarily liable. So
also he can require the representative of an insolvent bank to set off the note
against his deposit and thus relieve the accommodation maker. See Building Co.
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v. Bank of N. Y. (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 400, 99 N. E. io44; Negotiable Instruments
Law, sec. ii9.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADMISSION BY FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED BY STATE OFFicR.-A South Carolina constable illegally searched the
defendant's automobile. Solely on the testimony of the constable, the defendant
was convicted in a federal court of the unlawful transportation of liquor. Held,
that the evidence was properly admitted. Kanellos v. United States (1922,
C. C. A. 4 th) 282 Fed. 461.
Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure by federal agents or by state
officers co6perating with them is not admissible against the defendant in a federal
court, even though demand for the return of the evidence is not made until after
the jury is sworn. Amos v. United States (1921) 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct
266; United States v. Falloco (i922, W. D. Mo.) 277 Fed. 75; COMMENTS (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 518. The majority of the state courts will not inquire
into the legality of the method by which evidence has been obtained. Wigmore,
Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1922) 8 A. B. A. JoUR.
479; Chafee, The Progress of the Law, i919-1922. Evidence (1922) 35 HAIv.
L. REv. 673, 694; (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 178. It seems probable that
the testimony would not have been admitted if the action had been brought in the
state court. Towin of Blacksburg v. Beam (1916) 1O4 S. C. 146, 88 S. E. 441;
but see State v. Harley (1917) 107 S. C. 304, 92 S. E. 1034. An action by either
a state or federal officer, in regard to the enforcement of prohibition laws, has as
its ultimate authority the Eighteenth Amendment. See National Prohibition
Cases (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 386, 40 Sup. Ct 486, 488; Dowling, Concurrent
Power Under the Eighteenth Amendment (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 447, 471.
Where a federal prosecutor makes use of evidence obtained by state officers in
the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, it seems that federal courts
should dispose of the case as if the state officers were federal agents, rather than
as if they were private individuals. The reasoning of the present case, if carried
to its logical conclusion, would provide a means for nullifying previous decisions.
Amos v. United States, supra.
CONTRACTs-CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT-IMPOSSIBILITY OF ExERcISING POWER TO
TERMINATE CONTRAcT.-The plaintiff, a "Home for Women," contracted to admit
the defendant's testatrix in consideration of the promise of the latter to pay
$5,ooo immediately upon the execution of the contract. A by-law of the plaintiff
provided for a two months probation period during which she could leave or be
dismissed. She died before the expiration of the two months without having
paid the $5,ooo. The plaintiff sued her estate for this amount. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover, since the continued existence of the decedent was the
basis of the contract. Kirkpatrick Home for Childless Women v. Kenyon (1922,
Sup. Ct.) 119 Misc. 349, 194 N. Y. Supp. 703.
Mutual promises are sufficient consideration, even though each party has the
power of terminating his duty by notice or otherwise. Ford v. Dyer (1899) 148
Mo. 528, 49 S. W. ic9i. Accordingly, in the instant case the plaintiff had a right
to the payment of $5,ooo and a duty, conditional upon payment, to support the
defendant. Rule i of Sergt. Williams' Notes to Pordage v. Cole (1669, K. B.)
I Win's. Saund. 320; Mass. Biog. Soc. v. Russell (1918) 229 Mass. 524, 118 N. E.
662. Under the by-laws each party had a power to extinguish these jural
relations, and the exercise of the power was a condition subsequent to the
decedent's duty to pay. Upon the decedent's death the Home's contract was fully
performed, and performance of the condition became impossible. Such an
impossibility would not excuse performance of a condition precedent. Corbin,
Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent (1922) 22 COL.
L. REv. 421; Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp. (192o, N. D. N. Y.)
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266 Fed. 945; (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 298. When the performance of a
condition subsequent, which would divest an estate, is or becomes impossible, the
estate becomes absolute. Merrill v. Emery (183o, Mass.) io Pick 5o7. And a
contract subject to revocation at the "option" of either party is in full force
until actually revoked. Ford v. Dyer, supra. From these cases, and by analogy
to the cases of impossibility of performing conditions precedent, it seems that
impossibility should not excuse performance of a condition subsequent. More-
over, the Home's contracts were essentially aleatory; it undertook, in considera-
tion of a sum certain, performance of uncertain extent, depending on the length
of the life of each inmate. It is manifestly unjust to deprive the Home of its
profits when the extent of performance required is small, when no provision is
made to protect it from loss when the burden is great. See Corbin, op. cit. 427.
CORPORATIONS-Powns-SuBsRirTIoN By BANK TO STOCK OF LIGHTING COMt-
PANY.-The defendant, cashier of the plaintiff bank, subscribed to five shares of
stock of an electric company. The bank desired the formation of the company
in order to obtain lights for its banking house. The plaintiff alleged that the
money was wrongfully paid out in violation of a statute prohibiting banks from
investing their assets in the stock of other corporations. N. D. Comp. Laws,
1915, ch. 54, sec. I. Held, that the expenditure was not within the statutory
prohibition. Farmers' State Bank v. Richter (i922, N. D.) 189 N. W. 242.
There is no power in one corporation to purchase stock in another, unless
conferred expressly by charter or statute, or by implication as a necessary and
reasonable means of accomplishing the purpose for which the corporation was
created. Golden v. Cervenka (1917) 278 Ill. 4o9, 116 N. E. 273; Central Life
Securities Co. v. Smith (1916) 149 C. C. A. 360, 236 Fed. I7o; 2 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Corporations (1917) secs. 1117, 1118. The mere fact that it might
be profitable or beneficial does not authorize the purchase People v. Pullman
Car Co. (1898) 175 Ill. 125, 51 N. E. 664; Riley v. Callahan Mining Co. (1916) 28
Idaho, 525, 155 Pac. 665. But the corporation may purchase stock if such
purchase is necessary to facilitate the operation of the business for which the
corporation was organized. State v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (1912) 241 Mo. I, 144 S. W. 863
Fourth Nat. Bank of Nashville v. Stahlman (1915) 132 Tenn. 367, 178 S. W. 942;
Edwards v. Internat. Pavement Co. (1917) 227 Mass. 206, 116 N. E. 266. The
instant case accords a greater power to a corporation than any previous decision,
for hitherto a distinction has been drawn between the power to purchase and the
power tb subscribe, on the ground that a corporation should not be permitted to
instigate an entirely different business. Nebraska Shirt Co. v. Horton (i9o3) 3
Neb. (Unof.) 888, 93 N. W. 225; American Ball Bearing Co. v. Adams (1915,
D. C.) 222 Fed. 967.
CRiMINAL LAw--LARcEN'Y-PURCHASE ON MARGIN BY STOCKBRoxER.-The
defendant, a broker on the New York Cotton Exchange, bought and sold cotton
futures for one Oliver. Oliver received profits from time to time. When the
transactions were closed the defendant, having converted the money and gone
into bankruptcy, was unable to pay Oliver the original margin and the remaining
profits. The defendant was arrested for larceny under the New York statute
which provides that any bailee, trustee, or agent who appropriates the property
entrusted to him shall be guilty of larceny. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 40, sec.
1290. A writ of habeas corpus was sued out. Held, that the writ should issue,
since the relation between the parties was, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that of debtor and creditor. People, ex rel. Rosenberg, v. Hanley. (1922, Sup.
Ct) 196 N. Y. Supp. 194.
A stock-broker who is given money to buy particular stock becomes a trustee
as to both the money and the stock. I Dos Passos, Stock-brokers (2d ed. 1905)
i99. An appropriation to his own use makes the broker guilty of larceny under
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the New York statute. People v. Meadows (igio) I99 N. Y. I, 92 N. E. 128.
The broker holds stock purchased on margin as pledgee, and when the question
is raised in a civil action his relation to his client is considered a fiduciary one.
Haight v. Haight (19o) 46 Misc. 501, 92 N. Y. Supp. 934; Batterson v. Raymond
(1914) 87 Misc. 229, 149 N. Y. Supp. 7o6. The misappropriation by a broker
of funds held in a margin transaction has been held to be statutory larceny;
the New York courts refuse to hold him criminally liable in such cases now,
however, on the ground that the relationship between the broker and client is
one of debtor and creditor. Cf. Clark v. Pinckney (1867, N. Y.) 5o Barb. 226,
with People, ex rel. Mansfield, v. Flynn (igog) 64 Misc. 276, 118 N. Y. Supp. 533.
As was pointed out in the principal case, there is no valid distinction between the
purchase of cotton futures on margin and the purchase of stock on margin.
See Smith v. Craig (1914) 211 N. Y. 456, io5 N. E. 798. This decision is in
accord with authority, but in their language the courts seem to be making a
distinction between civil and criminal standards.
EQUITY-RETRIcIvE COVENANTS-EFFECT OF CHANGED CoNDrrIONs.-The
defendant owned one plot of a large tract of land on which were imposed. restric-
tive building covenants allowing only single dwelling houses to cost not less than
a stated amount. Subsequently the character of the neighborhood was changed
as a result of the erection of factories and stores. The plaintiffs, owners of lots
in the same tract, sought to enjoin the defendants from erecting stores in the
restricted area. Held, that the injunction should be granted. Bohm v. Silberstein
(1922, Mich.) 189 N. W. 899.
The usual effect of a restrictive covenant is to create an equitable easement
Werner v. Graham (i919) 181 Calif. 174, 183 Pac. 945; Riverbank Improvement
Co. v. Chadwick (1917) 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244; Pound, The Progress of
the Law, i9p8-x9P9 (1920) 33 HARv L. Rav. 813. Such a covenant is sometimes
held to vest in the promisee the right to specific performance against one holding
the restricted land with notice of the covenant. Cotton v. Cresse (1912) 80 N. J.
Eq. 540, 85 Atl. 6oo; Ames, Specific Performance for and against Strangers to
the Contract (19o4) 17 HARV. L. REv. 174; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed.
1920) 1434. But no relief is granted if enforcement becomes inequitable.
Norcross v. fames (1885) 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946; Burdell v. Grandi (i9o7)
152 Calif. 376, 92 Pac. io22. Thus, a restrictive covenant will not be enforced
if it will cause great damage to the defendant and if its original purpose cannot
be carried out and it is of little value to the plaintiff. Windetmere v. American,
State Bank (1919) 205 Mich. 539, 172 N. W. 29; Jackson v. Stevenson (1892)
156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 69I; Batchelor v. Hinkle (1914) 21o N. Y. 243, 1O4 N. E.
629; CommEmNTs (1914) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 61o; NoTS (1914) 14 COL L.
REV. 438. The construction of an elevated railroad adjacent to property restricted
by covenants to residences has been held to be conclusive evidence that the neigh-
borhood has so changed as to render the covenant unenforceable. Kneip v.
Schroeder (1912) 255 Ill. 621, 99 N. E. 617; ColhmbNa College v. Thatcher
(1882) 87 N. Y. 311. Nevertheless, the result in the instant case seems correct.
Although the adjoining land had become devoted to industry and commerce, the
observance of the restriction was still of substantial value to the entire area.
See Swan v. Mitshkun (1919) 207 Mich. 70, 173 N. W. 529; Brown v. Huber
(i9o9) 8o Ohio St 183, 88 N. E. 322; Wallack v. Smalwich Corp. (1922) Sup.
Ct) II8 Misc. Rep. io6, 192 N. Y. Supp. 462; 2 Devlin, Deeds (3d ed. 1911)
1875.
ExTRADITIoN-FuGrrIIV FRoM JUSTICE-CoNSTRUcTIVE PaaSENc--The partners
of the defendant obtained goods by false pretenses in Switzerland and shipped
them to the defendant in England. The defendant was later indicted for the crime
in Switzerland, and, on a demand by that country, an order for his extradition was
12
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issued in England. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that he was
subject to extradition. Rex v. Godfrey (1922, K. B.) 39 T. L. R. 5.
Treaties usually define a fugitive from justice as one charged with a crime in
country A who has sought asylum or is found within country B. 4 Moore, Inter-
national Law Digest (i9o6) sec. 593. The instant case held that one who commits
a crime "in" country A while physically in country B, can be deemed a fugitive
from justice from the former. See also Regina v. Nillins (1884, Q. B.) 53
L. J. M. C. 157; Regina v. Jacobi (1881, Q. B.) 46 L. T. R. 595. An American
Secretary of State appears to have taken a different view. Mr. Hay, Sec'y. of
State, to Baron Fava, Italian Ambassador, March 8, 190i, 4 Moore, op. cit. 287.
The view of the court, however, seems sound. Nevertheless, with respect to,
interstate rendition, it is not adopted in this country, and as a result persons
guilty of crime may escape trial. Under the United States Constitution it is
essential that the accused be within state A, commit a crime there, and then flee
to state B. Hyatt v. Corkran (19o3) I88 U. S. 691, 23 Sup. Ct. 456; Taft v. Lord
(1918) 92 Conn. 539, 1O3 AtI. 644. U. S. Const. (1789) Art 4, sec. 2. The
motive of flight is immaterial. Taylor v. Wise (1915) 172 Iowa, 1, 126 N. W.
1126; Ex parte Henke (1920) 172 Wis. 36, 177 N. W. 88o; Appleyard v. Mass.
(19o6) 203 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122. Even if the criminal commits in state A
only one overt act in furtherance of the crime and then leaves before the crime is
consummated, he is a fugitive from justice. State v. Gerber (191o) III Minn.
132, 126 N. W. 482; :Ex parte Pinch (1921) lo6 Neb. 45, 182 N. W. 565. But
he cannot be extradited if he commits a crime when only constructively present
in state A. Hyatt v. Corkran, supra; Ex parte Hoffstot (igio, C. C. N. Y.)
18o Fed. 24o; Jones v. Leonard (1878) 5o Iowa, io6; State v. Wellnzan (1918)
1O2 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1O52. This conflict may be explained by the difference
between the underlying statutory or treaty provisions in the international and
domestic proceedings. The international result produces more efficient administra-
tion of justice. For possible remedies in the interstate situation, see McCarthy,
A Constitutional Question Suggested by the Trial of William D. Haywood (19o7)
1g Green Bag, 636; (19o8) 21 HIAv. L. REv. 224; Spear, The Law of Extradi-
tion (3d ed. 1885) 400.
FUTURE INTERESTs-WnH.S-VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDRS.-The
testator devised a life estate in certain realty to his wife, and provided further
that "upon the death of my said wife, I direct that all the residue of my
estate .... be divided equally between my six children [naming them] share and
share alike. If any of them shall have died leaving issue, his share shall go to
such issue; but if any one shall have died without issue, his share shall be divided
equally among those who survive." The testator's wife and five of the children
were alive, the sixth having died without issue. The widow of the deceased son
applied to have the will construed. Held, that the widow received no interest, the
surviving children taking contingent remainders conditioned upon their surviving
the testator's widow. In re Wolber's Will (1922, Iowa) 189 N. W. 782.
A contingent remainder is merely the possibility or prospect of an estate which
exists when a future estate is subject to a condition precedent, or 'is created in
favor of an uncertain person or persons. Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o)
sec. 136. However, the remainder is vested when it does not depend on a condi-
tion precedent, and is always ready to come into the possession of an (existing
and) ascertained person on the determination of the particular estate in any
manner whatsoever. C. A. Graves, Real Property (1894) 19o; Howbert v.
Cawthorn (19o2) ioo Va. 649, 42 S. E. 683; see I Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 135;
Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) sec. ioi. But a future estate is
none the less vested because subject to be defeated by a condition subsequent. "If
the conditional element is incorporated into the description of, or the gift to the
remainder-man, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a
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vested interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested. Thus on a
devise to A for life, remainder to his children, but if any child dies in the lifetime
of A, his share to go to those who survive, the share of each child is vested,
subject to be divested by its death." Gray, op. cit. sec. io8 (3) ; see Calvert v.
Calvert (1921) 297 Ill. 22, 13o N. E. 347; Walker v. Alverson (igio) 87 S. C.
55, 68 S. E. 966. The devise in the instant case creates an immediate right to
possession in specified persons upon the determination of the precedent life estate,
subject to possible divestiture. It thus fulfills every requirement of a vested
remainder. It is true that the gift is in the form of a direction to divide at a
future time, but where, as here, the direction is to divide at the conclusion of the
preceding particular estate, the remainders created are not thereby prevented
from vesting. Carter v. Carter (i9o8) 234 Ill. 5o7, 85 N. E. 292; Atchison v.
Francis (1917) 182 Iowa, 37, 165 N. W. 587; L. R. A. 1918 E, lO97, note. It is
also true that the instant case ultimately leads to the same result, whether the
remainder be considered contingent or vested subject to be divested. See Fulton v.
Fulton (1917) 179 Iowa, 948, 162 N. W. 253. But the distinction may be of great
importance, particularly as to the effect of the rule against perpetuities, the aliena-
tion of the remainder, or its sale under execution. Rood, Wills (1904) sec. 6oi;
see Walker v. Alverson, supra; Caples v. Ward (1915, Tex.) 179 S. W. 856.
The tendency of the courts to regard all future estates subject to condition as
contingent has perhaps contributed much to the existing confusion in the cases
relating to future interests.
INSURANcE-LImITATION oF ACrION BINDING AGAINST MINOR BENEFIciARYA
certificate of insurance issued by the defendant on the life of the plaintiff's father
for the benefit of the plaintiff contained a provision that no suit should be brought
unless commenced within one year from the date of death. In 19o8 the insured
disappeared, the plaintiff then being eight years old. On reaching his majority the
plaintiff brought an action on the policy. Teld, that the plaintiff could not
recover. Beard v. Sovereign Lodge (1922, N. C.) 113 S. E. 661.
Reasonable conditions expressly limiting the time for the bringing of suits to a
period shorter than that fixed by the statute of limitations are generally held valid
as tending to promote diligence. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1868, U. S.)
7 Wall. 386; Vance, Innurance (19o4) sec. 191; but see Attleboro Mfg. Co. v.
Frankfort Marine Ins. Co. (1917, C. C. A. ist) 240 Fed. 573; Hcines v. Modern
Woodmen of America (192o) 189 Iowa, 651, 178 N. W. 1OO. Many states have
passed statutes expressly regulating such limitations in contracts. Sternheiner v.
Order of United Travelers (1917) 107 S. C. 291, 93 S. E. 8; Karnes v. American
Fire Ins. Co. (1898) 144 Mb. 413, 46 S. W. 166; Mills' Colo. Ann. Sts. 1912, sec.
3570 (2) ; 5 Joyce, Insurance (2d ed. 1918) sec. 3224. Some courts have refused
to enforce such conditions even in the absence of statute. Miller v. State Ins. Co.
(1898) 54 Neb. 121, 74 N. W. 416; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks (1904)
119 Ky. 261, 83 S. W. 615. The following are examples of conditions which
have been held unreasonable in their application: Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co.
(1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 158 (war making suit within the limited period practically
impossible) ; Magner v. Mutual Life Ass'n1. (1897) 17 App. Div. 13, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 862 (insurer delayed final determination till three days before the end of the
period) ; Martin v. State Ins. Co. (188--) 44 N. J. L. 485 (compliance with other
conditions inconsistent with the observance of the limitation clause). The infancy
of the beneficiary, however, does not defeat the operation of the condition. Mead
v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (19o4) 68 Kan. 432, 75 Pac. 475. It is not perceptible why
the protection with which the infant is customarily clothed should be relaxed in
this type of case. This is especially true since in North Carolina, as well as in
other states, the operation of the statute of limitations is expressly suspended by
statute during the infancy of the person entitled to sue. N. C. Cons. Sts. 192o,
art. 407; Wood, Limitations (4 th ed. 1916) sec. 238(a). Although the rights of
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the parties are considered fixed by the insurance contract, yet courts do not hesi-
tate to disregard express conditions not forming a substantial part of the agreed
equivalent, where they prove unreasonable. Muse v. Ass. Corp. (i89i) io8 N. C.
240, 13 S. E. 94; Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (I9O2) 17o N. Y. 13,
62 N. E. 763 (condition making the insurer the agent of the insured) ; Corbin,
Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent (1922) 22 COL. L.
REv. 421, 428. Conditions in policies, being "prepared by the wary and accepted
by the unwary," are, when possible, construed so as to avoid forfeiture. Hampton
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (igoo) 65 N. J. L. 265, 47 At!. 433; (1921) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 217; Thompson v. St. Charles County (1910) 227 Mo. 220, 231;
126 S. W. io44, 1O47. Although the instant case follows the orthodox rule, it
seems to press a doctrine, doubtful in the case of adults, to an unreasonable result
in the case of infants.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRATOR.-A trucking
company having an agreement to furnish a certain number of trucks daily to
a building contractor and to keep a representative on hand to oversee the drivers,
sublet some trucks ,with drivers from a truck renting company. The plaintiff
was injured through the negligence of a driver of one of the truck renting
company's trucks and brought suit against the contractor, the trucking company,
and the truck renting company. Held, (two judges dissenting) that he could
recover only from the trucking company. Wagner v. Motor Truck Renting
Corp. (1922) 234 N. Y. 31, 136 N. E. 229.
The responsibility for the torts of a servant who is borrowed or hired from
his general master for a particular piece of work is imposed upon the person
whose work is being done and who has control or the right to control when the
tort occurs. McNamara v. Leipzig (igig) 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E. 244; Pruitt
v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1922, Calif.) 2o9 Pac. 31.' The following tests are
applied as evidential of these facts: Who selected the servant? Who pays his
wages? Who has the power to discharge? Quarman v. Burnett (184o, Exch.>
6 M. & W. 497; Laugher v. Pointer (1826, K. B.) 5 Barn. & Cr. 547;
Diamond v. Sternberg Motor Truck Co. (1914, Sup. Ct.) 87 Misc. 305, 149 N. Y.
Supp. iooo; Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson (199o) 212 U, S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252.
The transfer of an instrumentality with the servant is commonly considered a
criterion of transfer of control to the special master. Labatt, Master and Servant
2d ed. 1913) 175. Although these tests may furnish a rough guide, no stand-
ardized analysis of the facts is of any real use. (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
682. In a close case the question of control is for the jury. Cattini v. American
Ry. Express Co. (1922, Sup. Ct.) 196 N. Y. Supp. io. The instant case is
typically borderline. The majority and minority opinions expressed the law by
identical quotations, and then proceeded to apply it to the facts of the case with
directly opposite conclusions.
MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-LABILITY OF AN OFFICER FOR THE Loss OF PUBLIC
FuNDs.-The plaintiff, serving without compensation as bond commissioner of the
defendant city, made a general deposit of its sinking funds, in a local bank. He
was under a duty to invest the money in certain bonds within six months, and to
keep the funds safely. Several years later, it was found that the bank had misap-
propriated the bonds. The bank became insolvent. Held, that the plaintiff must
account for the full amount of the funds. Wiley v. City of Sparta (1922, Ga.)
114 S. E. 45.
The general rule is that a public officer is absolutely liable for the loss of public
funds with which he is entrusted. (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 329; Dowling,
Liability of Public Officers for Loss of Public Funds (1902) 55 CENT. L. JouR.
483. But it has been suggested that he should be liable only when the loss is due
to his negligence. Stein, The Liability of the Custodian of Public Funds Lost
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Without His Fault (19o3) I MICH. L. REv. 557, 585. The orthodox rule, origi-
nating in the conception of the officer as an ordinary debtor, is continued on grounds
of policy when the liability is not governed by statute or by the express terms of
an official bond. Leachuman v. Board of Supervisors (igig) 124 Va. 616, 98 S. E.
656. The protection of public funds against fraud seems to require such a rule.
Tillinghast v. Merrill (I896) 15I N. Y. 135, 45 N. E. 375. In spite of the fact
that the liability does not extend to losses due to an act of God or the public
enemy, the public officer has been called a debtor. I Dillon, Municipal Corpora-
tions (1911) 763. His duties have generally been worked out as if he were a
bailee, however, even though no specific res is to be returned. United States v.
Thomas (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 337; see (1921) 5 MINN. L. Rlv. 308. If so
considered, the case is somewhat analogous to the absolute liability of a common
carrier. (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 664. The liability of a carrier ceases to
be absolute, however, when the serviecs are gratuitous, because then they are no
longer of a public character. 2 Wyman, Public Service Corporations (i911) 851.
It is obvious that no such argument would apply in the'principal case. Perhaps
it would be more proper to call a public officer a trustee. Crane Township v.
Secoy (1921, Ohio) 132 N. E. 851. But the same result would have been reached,
because the unauthorized deposit was allowed to remain for too long a time.
Bogert, Trusts (92) 353. It has been suggested that statutes should be passed
to relieve an officer of this hardship, or that a compulsory place of deposit should
be indicated. Dowling, op. cit. 491. In the absence of such protection, the posi-
tion of a public officer seems undesirable, unless the dangers of loss are covered by
insurance.
PLEADING-AIDER OF CROss-COMPLAINT BY OTHER PLEADINGs.-The plaintiff
brought an action for separate maintenance and the defendant filed a cross-action
for divorce. Held, that the failure of the cross-complaint to allege the plaintiff's
residence was fatal and could not be cured or aided by the allegations or admissions
contained in the other pleadings. Bullard v. Bullard (1922, Calif.) 209 Pac. 361.
The authorities are meagre but appear to be with the principal case. Conger v.
Miller (1885) 1O4 Ind. 592, 4 N. E. 300; Dudam v. McDonald (1917) 34 Calif.
App. 744, 168 Pac. 1O63. The reason for the rule is that a cross-complaint, like a
complaint, must stand on its own allegations. Ezing v. Patterson (1871) 35 Ind.
326; Kreichbaum v. Melton (1874) 49 Calif. 5o. But a complaint may be aided
by the adverse pleadings. Lux & Talbott Stofw Co. v. Donaldson (1903) 162 Ind.
481, 68 N. E. 1014; Probate Court v. Van Dazer (1841) I3 Vt. 135; United
States v. Morris (1825, U. S.) io Wheat. 246; 4 Enc. P1. & Prac. 6o8. This is
true by the better view even when the adverse pleading is a denial. Feibelinan v.
Manchester, etc. Co. (1895) io8 Ala. i8o, 19 So. 540; Catlin v. Jones (19o6) 48
Or. 158, 85 Pac. 515; Merrynan v. Kirby (igio) 13 Calif. App. 344, 109 Pac. 635;
contra, Scofield v. Whitelegge (1872) 49 N. Y. 259. Another analogy for refusing
to allow defects in the cross-complaint to be cured by allegations in the main
pleading may be found in the rule that a defect in one count of a complaint
setting up more than one course of actioi cannot be supplied from statements in
other counts unless expressly referred to in the former. Haskell v. Haskell
(188o) 54 Calif. 262. The rule of the instant case seems to be a survival of the
almost obsolete excessive strictness in pleading requirements. The pleadings have
fulfilled their functions when all the material facts are in issue at the trial.
STATUTEs-CoNsTITUTIoNALITy-DEFINITENEss.-The Ohio Workmen's Com-
pensation Act provides that where an injury to an employee arose through the
failure of the employer to comply with any "lawful requirement" for the protec-
tion of his employees, the civil liability of such employer should not be affected,
but that the injured party might at his option either claim compensation under the
Act or sue for damages. Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 1465-1476. Section 12,593
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provides that 'whoever .... employing another . . . causes to be erected
'unsuitable or improper scaffolding' . . . . shall be fined not more than $5oo or
imprisoned not more than 3 months or both." The plaintiff was injured by a
defect found by the jury to exist in the defendant's scaffolding, and he sued for
damages, claiming that the defendant had violated a "lawful requirement" under
this section. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the statute was too indefinite
and vague to constitute a "lawful requirement." Patten v. Aluminum Castings
Co. (1922, Ohio) 136 N. E. 426.
A statute imposing criminal liability must clearly and explicitly define the crime
because the accused is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusations
against him. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co, (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 298;
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States (1914, C. C. A. 8th) 213 Fed. 162. But a
statute imposing civil liability is valid unless it violates some constitutional
provision, or is too indefinite and uncertain to be reasonably interpreted. Coggins
v. Ely (1921, Ariz.) 202 Pac. 391; Mitchell v. Coast Line Co. (1922) 183 N. C.
162, io S. E. 859. A* statute dealing with rules or standards of conduct must
necessarily be expressed in general terms, and the application of those rules will
depend upon varying circumstances. Miller v. Strahl (1915) 239 U. S. 426, 36
Sup. Ct. 147; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (i9op) 212 U. S. 86, 29 Sup. Ct.
220; State v. Schaeffer (1917) 96 Ohio, 215, 117 N. E. 22o; Pound, An Introduc-
tion. to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 116 et seq.; Freund, The Use of Indefinite
Terms in Statutes (1921) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 437. The instant decision
seems to be based upon the erroneous assumption that the statute is distinctly and
solely penal in its nature. But even a penal statute may impose some civil liability.
Narranmre v. Cleveland Ry. (1899, C. C. A. 6th) 96 Fed. 298; Hepner v. United
States (1909) 213 U. S. 103, 29 Sup. Ct 474. Assuming that the statute is too
indefinite to impose a criminal liability, there seems to be no reason why it may
not reasonably establish a civil standard of conduct, since in effect the statute
merely expresses in statutory form the recognized standard of the "reasonably
prudent man." Statutes similarly worded have been upheld as satisfying due
process of law. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct 289;
Aiton v. Board of Medical Examiners (1911) 13 Ariz. 354, 114 Pac. 962. The
trend of modern legislation indicates a tendency to delegate quasi-legislative
powers. There seems to be no reason why a legislature may not leave to a jury
the duty of determining whether the scaffolding is unsuitable. Furthermore, in
the instant case it appears that Section 12,594 sufficiently defines the nature of
"improper" scaffolding to permit Section 12,593 to apprise an employer of his
legal obligations. The court, by holding the provision void in effect disregarded
the requirement of Article IV, Section 2, of the Ohio Constitution, which provides
that "no law shall be held to be unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges." See The Toledo
Cooker Co. v. Sniegowski (1922, Ohio) 136 N. E. 9o4.
TROVER-DEMAND AND RErusAL.-The plaintiff agreed to sell personal property
to the Timberland Company, title to pass upon payment of the purchase price.
Before title passed the Timberland Company sold the property to the defendant
who consumed a part. The plaintiff brought trover without a demand and refusal.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Wyman v. Carrabassett Lumber Co. (1922,
Me.) II6 Atl. 729.
The situations are few where a defendant cannot be sued as a converter without
a demand and refusal. Carelton v. Lovejoy (1867) 54 Me. 445 (borrower);
Nicholson v. Chapman (1793, C. P.) 2 H. BI. 254 (finder); Smith v. Durham
(igoo) 127 N. C. 417, 37 S. E. 473 (bailee). In such cases the defendant acquires
possession lawfully and until after a demand and refusal does no act inconsistent
with the plaintiff's ownership. When the defendant does such an act, the general
rule permits trover without demand. Dowd v. Wadsworth (1829, N. C.) 2 Dev.
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130 (bailee lent chattel bailed and acted as owner). And so the obtaining by the
defendant of a chattel from the plaintiff through fraud or trespass is of itself a
conversion. Thurston v. Blanchard (1839) 39 Mass. 18; Quitnan Co. v. Conway
(1912) 63 Fla. 253, 58 So. 84o. The question is more complex where the defen-
dant innocently buys the plaintiff's chattel from a third person. Most courts hold
that trover or replevin will lie in such a case without a revious demand. Hyde v.
Noble (1843) 13 N. H. 494; Eldred v. Oconto (1873) 33 Wis. 139. In a few
jurisdictions, however, a demand and refusal are necessary if the defendant is
morally innocent. Gullet v. Roberts (1874) 57 N. Y. 28; Planzo Mfg. Co. v.
N. Pac. Elevator Co. (1892) 5i Minn. 167, 53 N. W. 2o2; Parker v. Middlebrook
(I855) 24 Conn. 2W. New York has applied this rule even where he is not a
purchaser for value. Goodwin v. Wertheiiner (1885) 99 N. Y. i49, I N. E. 404
(assignee for the benefit of creditors). These cases are indicative of an indisposi-
tion to apply the orthodox rules of conversion where it is possible for the plaintiff
to regain his goods, at least where the goods are undamaged. But trover will lie
at once, even under the New York rule, against an innocent agent in possession
who sells or otherwise deprives the plaintiff of his property. Everett v. Coffin
(1831, N. Y.) 6 Wend. 603; contra, Fargason v. Ball (1913) x28 Tenn. 137, 159
S. W. 2I. The contrary result is reached where negotiable instruments are the
subject of the sale. Pratt v. Higginson (I918) 23o Mass. 256, ug N. E. 661;
COMMENTS (198) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 175. The rules of conversion are
relaxed in favor of common carriers. Gurley v. Armstead (1889) 148 Mass. 267,
ig N. E. 389 (carriage for the delivery to thief no conversion); Dixon v. So.
Pacific Co. (1918) 42 Nev. 73, 172 Pac. 368 (common carrier must surrender goods
if demand made while in its possession). In the principal case the defendant
"entirely used up" some of the property. As to such property, there would be no
reason to modify the rule even if the defendant were an innocent purchaser for
value, since the reason of the New York rule would not apply. The court very
properly allowed in mitigation of damages the value of the property retaken by the
plaintiff.
TRuSTs-DvaaSioN BY EXECUTOR OF FUNDS OF ONE ESTATE TO CovER DEFALCA-
TION IN ANOTHER ESTATE.-A defaulting executor of the S estate, in order to
conceal his defalcations, diverted money into that estate from trust funds of the D
estate, of which he was also executor. The D estate sued the S estate to recover
the funds so diverted. Held, that the D estate could recover. Whiting v. Hudson
Trust Co. (1922) 202 App. Div. 375, 195 N. Y. Supp. 829.
When wrongfully acquired money is mingled with other money its identity is
not considered destroyed. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully
Mingled with Other Money (1913) 27 HARV. L. REv. 125. But a bona fide trans-
feree for value of money or bills of exchange may keep them. Miller v. Race
(1758, K. B.) I Burr. 452, 457; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) 450. In a
situation like that in the instant case the courts ask, first, whether the S estate
is a bona fide transferee of the money, and secondly, whether it has given value
therefor. Lack of bona fides is held not proved by the knowledge of the fraudu-
lent trustee or agent, because the "presumption of disclosure" is held to be
negatived when the transaction is one which the trustee or agent would normally
conceal from his cestui or his principal. Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat. Bank
(1885) 139 Mass. 332, I N. E. 282; Baker, Application of Money Wrongfully
Procured, etc. (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REv. 225; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4th ed. 1918) 1355. Payment of a pre-existing debt constitutes value. Stephens
v. Board of Education (879) 79 N. Y. 183; Negotiable Imstruments Law, sec. 25;
Uniform Sales Act, sec. 76; Uitiform Stock Transfer Act, sec. 22. Therefore a
trust estate is treated as a bona fide purchaser for value of fraudulently procured
money when such money is paid into it by the trustee in satisfaction of a debt
owed by him. See London Banking Co. v. River Plate Bank (1888) L. R.
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20 Q. B. Div. 232; Stephens v. Board of Education, supra; Craft v. South
Boston Railroad (1889) i5o Mass. 207, 22 N. E. 92o. Since such payment is
beneficial, it takes effect, in the absence of disaffirmance, as if accepted at the time
by the beneficiary; assent is said to be presumed. London Banking Co. v. River
Plate Bank, su-pra; cf. Thornton, Gifts and Advancements (893) 71. 'But the
principal case relies largely upon a Massachusetts case holding that the knowledge
of the trustee should be imputed to his trust estate, so that the trust estate was
unjustly enriched by the payment. Newell v. Hadley (igio) 206 Mass. 335, 92
N. E. 5o7. In that case the court attempted to distinguish the Craft case, supra,
on the ground that in the latter case there was evidence from which a change of
position by the defendant might have been inferred. The dissenting opinion,
however, points out that there is no sound distinction between the two cases. The
better rule and the one more in accordance with the current of authority, is that
a trust estate or a principal receiving such funds from its defaulting trustee or
agent should be protected. London Banking Co. v. River Plate Bank, supra;
Weston, Money Stolen by a Trustee from one Trust and Used for Another (1912)
25 HARv. L. REv. 602; Baker, op. cit. Under either solution, the result seems
harsh; but both parties have in the same manner trusted the same defaulter; to
shift the loss from where it has fallen at the time of discovery is at best arbitrary,
and the widespread application of the bona fide purchase for value doctrine to the
situation shows that most courts wisely feel such action to be unwarranted. The
application of the rule with respect to property other than money or negotiable
securities might raise other questions.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE-ONLY CLAUSES AFFECTED INVALIDATED.-The testa-
trix, presumably through the undue influence of one S, bequeathed to him $5,ooo,
and gave the rest of her estate to the value of about $ioooo to some of her
heirs and to charitable institutions. Other heirs contested the will. Held, that
the whole will was void, since' undue influence was exercised by one of the
beneficiaries. Snyder v. Steele (I922) 304 Ill. 387, 136 N. E. 649.
It has been universally held that in a will only those gifts obtained by undue
influence are invalid. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Baily (i9o9) 202 Mass. 283, 88
N. E. 898; In re McCaffrey's Will (1918, Surrs.) 105 Misc. 433, 173 N. Y. Supp.
392; Walker v. Irby (i921, Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 331; 41 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1126, note; Gardner, Wills (I9o3) i79. The same rule is applied if the gift is
induced by fraud. Gardner, loc. cit. Although there is but little authority in
point it seems that a will may be only partly invalidated even by lack of testa-
mentary capacity. Thus, if the testator bequeathes part of his property under
an insane delusion, and makes a normal disposition of the rest, it seems that only
the gift caused by the delusion should be declared void. See Holmes v. Campbell
College (1912) 87 Kan. 597, 125 Pac. 25; contra, Randolph v. Lampkin (I89O)
90 Ky. 55I, L4 S. W. 538. But if the entire instrument is tainted with undue
influence, or if it is impossible to determine to what extent specific legacies are
affected, the whole will is set aside. Coghill v. Kennedy (I898) iig Ala. 641, 24
So. 459; In re Cooper's Will (IgoS, Prerog.) 75 N. J. Eq. 177, 71 Atl. 676. In
the instant case the court states that its decision is in accord with "the greater
weight of authority" and has "always been the law in Illinois." No case has
been found in any other jurisdiction to warrant such an assertion. Previous
Illinois cases have not squarely raised the question of "part valid and part
invalid," the broad rule having been laid down that where the execution of a
will'is induced by undue influence, the whole will is void. Gum v. Reep (i916)
275 Ill. 503, 510, 114 N. E. 271, 274; Weston v. Tetfel (1904) 213 Ill. 291, 299,
72 N. E. goS, gio. The court in the instant case, by giving too much weight to
previous Illinois cases, lost an opportunity' to place Illinois in line with other
jurisdictions.
